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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Mat ter of : //2A-12/2/80 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,
 : 
Respondent, : BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
-and-
CA5E NO. U-4725 
-JACOB-ABRAMSON-,-SAUL-GOTTLIEB^ -:—- -
SETH WOHL and NORMAN SIROTA, 
Charging Parties. 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ., (NANCY E. 
HOFFMAN, ESQ.,, of Counsel) for 
Respondent 
SAUL GOTTLIEB,' pro se 
The charge herein was filed by Saul Gottlieb, and others, 
on May 22, 1980. It alleges that the United Federation of 
Teachers (UFT) violated its duty of fair representation in that 
it failed to represent the charging parties in layoff proceedings 
and in civil litigation matters. The hearing officer determined 
that the charging parties were not in any unit represented by 
UFT, and on September 24, 1980, dismissed the charge. In a 
letter dated October 24, 1980, and postmarked the following day, 
Mr. Gottlieb filed exceptions to the hearing officer's decision. 
UFT responded to the exceptions on October 28, 1980, and urged 
that the exceptions be dismissed because they were filed by 
Mr. Gottlieb more than fifteen working days after his receipt of 
the decision of the hearing officer and are, thus, not timely. 
•'•  f?Kt>£* 
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Section 204.10 of the Rules of this Board permits the filing 
of exceptions within fifteen working days after the receipt of 
the decision of a hearing officer. If filed by mail, the act of 
mailing must occur two days before the due date of any filing. 
(Rule 200.10). Mr. Gottlieb received his copy of the decision 
of the hearing officer on October 4, 1980. Allowing for weekends 
and the holiday of Columbus Day, his exceptions should have been 
filed by October 21. He did not do so and he did not request an 
extension of time during which to file exceptions. 
Section 204.12 of the Rules of this Board provides that in 
the event of "extraordinary circumstances", we may extend the 
time during which a request may be made for an extension of time 
to file exceptions.— Mr. Gottlieb has alleged no such extra-
ordinary circumstances. By way of explanation of his late filing 
Mr. Gottlieb wrote without specifying details that his exceptions 
should be deemed timely because he received his copy of the 
decision late because of a death in his family. 
Mr. Gottlieb has not indicated any specific facts showing 
how he was prejudiced by the circumstances of a death in his 
family. Hence the extension of his time during which to file 
exceptions due to extraordinary circumstances is not justified. 
The effect of the delay in Mr. Gottlieb's receipt of the decision 
did not prejudice him. His time to file exceptions ran from 
the date of his receipt of that decision. 
1 See Westbury/Handy, 12 PERB 1(3107 (1979) . 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the- exceptions of 
Saul Gottlieb be, and they hereby 
are, dismissed. 
DATED-:- - New-York, -New -York 
December 2, 1980 
^^%Z*&*£ ^ ?4&+v-**<-~ 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
£&*- /teg^iA^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//2B-12/2/80 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4373 
JOSEPH M. BRESS, ESQ., (FLORENCE T. FRAZER, 
ESQ., of Counsel) for Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH (STEPHEN J. WILEY, 
ESQ., of Counsel) for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a hearing officer's decision dismissing its charge 
that the State of New York (State) violated its duty to negoti-
ate in good faith by unilaterally requiring the payment of a 
five dollar application fee as a prerequisite to-; participation 
in open competitive civil service examinations. 
The hearing officer found that, in,1963,the State sus-
pended a prior practice of charging an application fee for open 
competitive civil service examinations. On July 9, 1979,it 
notified CSEA that the application fee would be reinstated and 
it did reinstate the fee on July 24, 1979. - The CSEA president 
expressed dissatisfaction with the reinstitution of the fee, but 
no•demand.was made to negotiate the subject. 
V The authority for this action is CSL §50.5. ? ^^0,Q 
In the Matter of : 
STATE OF NEW YORK, : 
Respondent, : 
-and- : 
--CTVTL SERVICE- EMPLOYEES-ASSOCIATION,- •. 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, : 
Charging Party. : 
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The hearing officer further found that there is a distinc-
tion between open competitive and promotional civil service exam-
inations. The former may be taken by anyone, whether or not 
already employed by the State, who meets the minimum qualifications 
for the position for which the examination is given. The latter 
may be taken only by present employees within a promotional series 
of titles and is for advancement by reason in part of their State 
service, from one title to another within the series. He also 
found that some State employees are limited to open competitive 
examinations either because the position they are seeking is not 
within their promotional series or because they aire not otherwise 
eligible for the promotional examination. Examples of reasons why 
a State employee may not be eligible for a promotional examination 
are that he does not have permanent status in his current position 
or that he does not have sufficient time in the current position 
to qualify for the promotional examination. 
On these facts, the hearing officer determined that open 
competitive examinations are directed at the public at large; that 
current State employment is not a requirement for participation in 
such an examination; and that State employees who take them are no 
different from the public at large. He concluded that present 
State employment carries no reasonable expectancy of progression 
into positions covered by open competitive examinations. He found 
bhat the fee is totally unrelated to employment status and cannot 
3e considered a term or condition of employment, and concluded 
that the State did not violate its duty to negotiate in good faith 
Arhen it reinstated the application fee. 
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In support of its exceptions, CSEA argues that an opportu-
nity for a current employee to take a civil service examination 
without having to pay a fee is a financial benefit and hence a 
term and condition of employment with respect to which the State 
could not act unilaterally. 
The exemption of State employees from, an application fee 
requirement for the taking of open competitive examinations would 
be a financial benefit and a term and condition of employment.— 
Had CSEA sought to negotiate for such an exemption, the State 
would.have been obligated to negotiate the matter. In fact, apart 
from a protest in general terms against the proposed action, CSEA 
sought no negotiations. In its charge, CSEA protests the total 
unilateral action of the State which imposed a fee upon all 
applicants for open competitive examinations whether or not they 
are State employees. The State's action was not directed at 
current State employees as such. Its application to current 
State employees was only incidental to the substance of the charge 
The action of the State may be analogized to that of a gov-
ernment that maintains a bridge, the use of which has been toll-
free. If that government decided to impose a toll for the use of 
the bridge, its employees, as well as other constituents, would be 
affected. The same would be true thereafter if the government 
2 See Haverstraw v. Newman, 75 AD2d 844, 13 PERB I70Q6 (2nd Dep't, 
1980), in which the Appellate Division affirmed a decision of 
this Board that legal insurance is a form of compensation and, 
as such, a term and condition' of employment. 
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decided to increase the toll. Notwithstanding the financial im-
pact of such action upon the government's employees, there would 
be no duty to negotiate with the union representing its employees 
before imposing or raising the tolls. A different conclusion 
would be reached if the union sought to negotiate an exemption 
for unit employees or if unit employees, alone had_ been exempted 
from the fee and the government unilaterally eliminated that ex-
emption. The union did not seek to initiate any .negotiations. " .In -City 
of New York, 9 PERB 1f3076 (1976) , we held that a public employer 
could not unilaterally withdraw the special privilege that had 
been afforded to a limited group of employees of free transporta-
tion on a ferry that the public employer operated. 
NOW, THEREFORE,-WE affirm the decision of the hearing offi-
cer and VJE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed. 
DATED, New York, New York 
December 2, 1980 
Harold R. Newman, C Chairman 
%U. /VL^os 
Ida Klaus, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
I n t h e M a t t e r of i #2C-12/2/80 
CITY OF BUFFALO, • : BOARD DECISION AND 
R e s p o n d e n t , : ORDER 
- a n d - :' ' 
LOCAL 2651, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, : CASE NO, U-4473 
COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, : 
— „__..,_ -: Chargring -P-a-r-ty-„ -'• 
JOSEPH P. MCNAMARA, ESQ., (RAUL FIGUEROA, 
ESQ., of Counsel) for Respondent 
GORSKI & MANIAS (JEROME C. GORSKI, ESQ,., 
of Counsel) for Charging Party 
This case comes to us on the exceptions of the City of 
Buffalo (City) to a decision that it unilaterally changed a term 
and condition of employment on February 1, 1980, in that it dis-
continued the practice of permitting its building inspectors to 
use their personal automobiles for work and reimbursing them for 
such use. Instead, it offered to pay their bus fare,, The City 
admitted the unilateral action and defended its conduct by 
asserting a contractual right to do so'.' In its exceptions, it 
argues that the hearing officer should have declined to assert 
jurisdiction because the charge merely alleges a contract violation 
Building inspectors have used their own cars for work and 
been reimbursed for such use since at least 1963. Past collective 
agreements, however, have been silent as to the right of building 
inspectors, as a matter of their own choice, to use their personal 
automobiles for work and as to the reimbursement rate under such 
circumstances. The 1976-77 agreement did set a $4.50 per day 
Board - U-4473 
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reimbursement rate for the use of a private automobile when its 
use is required by the City„ At stated, in pertinent part: 
"[E]mployees who are required to use their 
personal automobiles on.City business shall be 
compensated at the rate of $4„50 per dayD 
Those employees, who are required to travel through-
out the City on City business shall be reimbursed 
for any travel expenses incurred when they do not 
own automobiles br"~d^"not_"u^"_th^iT"~autom^lQ"esT" 
(emphasis supplied) 
The rate specified in that agreement and in prior agreements for 
the reimbursement of employees who were required to use their 
personal automobiles was extended in the past to employees who 
were permitted to do so. 
During negotiations for an agreement to succeed the one 
that expired on June 30, 1979, Local 2651, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Local 
2651) demanded an increase in the allowance specified in the 
agreement to $50250 The City opposed any -increase„ At one point 
during negotiations, it counter-proposed that inspectors be given 
free bus tokens., The union rejected the proposal, and it was 
not discussed again during negotiations„ The parties did not 
reach an agreement, and eventually the dispute was submitted to 
the City's legislative body. In response to the union's continu-
ing request for an increase of the automobile allowance to $5„25, 
the City offered the suggestion that inspectors could use buses 
if not satisfied with the existing rate. In December 1979, the 
City Council imposed a legislative determination which provided 
that: 
"The existing collective bargaining agreement 
between the parties, be continued until June 30, 
1980 except for the changes therein as recommended 
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in the factfinder's report...and with the following 
additional changes... the auto allowance for members 
of Local No. 2651 be increased to $5.25 per day." 
The legislative action was still in effect at the time of the 
City's unilateral action at issue before us. 
The hearing officer determined that the issue before him 
did not involve the interpretation of a contract. He found 
that the issue before him would not be one of contract interpre-
tation even -if the-legislatively- imposedsettlement -were - deemed 
to be the equivalent of a contract.— He reasoned that the con-
tract, or its legislative equivalent, merely deals with the 
obligation of the City to reimburse employees who are required to 
use their personal automobiles, while the instant issue involved 
the right of employees to be reimbursed for the use of their 
personal automobiles when they are permitted to use them. The 
latter issue, he ruled, was covered by a long-standing past 
practice and not by the provisions of the contract. 
In its exceptions, the City argues that the prior con-
tract, and its extension by the legislative determination, gave 
the City an option to require or not to require the use of per-
sonal automobiles and it set a reimbursement rate only for such 
required use of automobiles. Thus, according to the City, it 
was not obligated to compensate employees except when personal 
automobile use was required. In effect, the City argues, Local 
2651 consented to unilateral action by it concerning permitted 
use of personal automobiles. 
1 See Massapequa Union Free School District, 8 PEK.B 1f3022 (1975) 
in which we held that coverage of a subject by a legislative 
determination has the same consequences regarding the obliga-
tion to negotiate the subject thereafter as does coverage of 
the ' subj ect by an agreement. 
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The City's position is not consistent with either its 
own past practice or its actions during the negotiations„ The 
past practice was to permit the use of personal automobiles by 
employees and to extend the contractual rate for required use 
of personal automobiles to permitted use of personal automobiles „ 
The negotiation position, of Bie'~City^on£xi^s'~±^~'aW^ene^s''o^ 
these past practices,• When confronted with a demand for an 
increase in the reimbursement rate for the required use of 
personal automobiles, it responded that the building inspectors 
could use public transportation if the;/ were not satisfied with 
the existing rate0 Clearly, that response could have meaning 
only with respect to the permitted and not the required use of 
personal automobiles„'• 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing 
officer, and 
WE ORDER the City to return to the 
practice in effect prior to 
February 1, 1980, of permitting " 
building inspectors in the nego-
tiating unit represented by Local 
2651 to use personal automobiles 
in the performance of their jobs, 
and to reimburse such employees 
therefor under the rate 
established by the City Council 
!
" O -f> A <r» 
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for the use of their automobiles 
since February 1, 1980. 
DATED: New York, New York 
December 1, 1980 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
S^uJdh^^i. 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
O .*"> /> l-«H 
wAn 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 




STEUBEN-ALLEGANY BOCES UNIT, STEUBEN 
COUNTY CHAPTER of the CIVIL SERVICE 






CASE NO. U-4259 
HENRY M. HILLE, ESQ., for Respondent 
RAYMOND F. DUCHARME,:: for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Steuben-Allegany 
BOCES (BOCES) to a hearing officer's determination that it 
violated §209.a.1(d) of the Taylor Law by acting unilaterally 
when it issued a directive on June 19, 1979, limiting employees 
who wished to smoke in an office building to two designated 
smoking areas. 
FACTS 
BOCES moved some of its offices to a new building in 1976. 
Before doing so, it told some of its employees that after the 
move, smoking would be limited to specified smoking areas. This 
message was not communicated directly to the Steuben-Allegany 
30CES Unit, Steuben County Chapter of the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc. (CSEA), charging party herein,and neither BOCES 
nor CSEA ever proposed negotiations regarding the right of 
employees to smoke while working. 
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From the time of the move in 1976, until June 19, 1979, 
BOCES continued to permit employees to smoke at their work 
stations. Throughout this time, the only space that BOCES deemed 
adequately ventilated for smoking was the conference room and, 
on occasion, it was unavailable to employees who wished to 
smoke. The June 19, 1979 directive was issued after BOCES 
comp 1 ete"d" the ~vent iTa. t ioii "of" the ~ki tcheh7: Pursuaht to "the 
directive, smoking would be permitted only in the conference 
room or the kitchen. Employees who wished to smoke were per-
mitted to do so during their coffee breaks. They were also 
permitted to take work into the conference room or kitchen where 
that was feasible. Moreover, they were permitted to utilize the 
half-hour coffee break time in more frequent and shorter 
intervals than the two traditional fifteen-minute breaks. The 
restriction on smoking in office rooms was not applicable to unit 
employees only. It applied to non-unit employees and to visitors 
in the building as well. 
BOCES, which had been asked by some employees to provide 
them with a smoke-free work environment, considered the new 
procedure to be a reasonable compromise between the interests of 
smoking and nonsmoking employees. CSEA, however, was not 
satisfied and it filed both a grievance and the improper practice 
charge herein. On October 12, 1979, an arbitrator denied the 
grievance on the ground that the collective agreement between 
BOCES and CSEA "unambiguously reserved to management any rights 
£*COfl 
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it had before the contract was signed except those 'expressly 
.1 
and specifically' abridged.1^ 
In the improper practice case, BOCES again pointed to the 
management rights clause of the contract and asserted that by 
agreeing to it, CSEA waived any right it may have had to 
- -negotiate- r egar-ding smoking - right s o f emp -1-o-yees-.-—It also argued 
that, in any event, the arbitration award had dealt with the 
question and was dispositive of the issue. The hearing officer 
rejected both of these arguments. He determined that the 
language of the. management rights clause was too general to con-
stitute a waiver of CSEA's right to negotiate a matter not 
specifically covered by the contract and that the arbitrator's 
contrary conclusion was not binding upon this Board. 
Dealing with the merits of the charge, the hearing officer 
determined that the directive restricting smoking to specified 
locations was a work rule that dealt with a term and condition 
of employment. Balancing the unit employees' interest in 
negotiating this term and condition of employment against 
1 The language of the management.rights clause is: 
"" "Any and all rights, powers and authority the Employer 
had prior to entering this Agreement are retained by 
the Employer except as expressly and specifically 
abridged, delegated, granted or modified by this 
Agreement." 
2_ These determinations were made in an interim decision 
13 PERB T4511 (1980), in which the hearing officer denied 
a motion to dismiss the charge. 
ooxO 
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management's interest in controlling the work environment and 
in satisfying some non-unit employees, the hearing officer 
determined that the unit employees' interest predominated, and 
he concluded that the directive involved a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. In making this determination, the hearing officer 
noted that the office building in which smoking was limited was 
not normally used by students, thus, BOCES could not argue 
persuasively that the limitation on smoking was designed to in-
fluence student conduct. 
., DECISION 
In its exceptions, BOCES argues that the hearing officer 
should have accepted the arbitrator's award, that he ignored 
evidence that the union had waived its right to negotiate and 
that he erred in finding the restriction on smoking to be a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. Each of these arguments was 
presented to and considered by the hearing officer. For the 
reasons set forth in his decision, we affirm the conclusions 
of the hearing officer. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER BOCES TO: 
1. Rescind and cease enforcement of its 
June 1979 directive regarding smoking 
restrictions insofar as that directive 
and enforcement practice apply to employees 
in the unit represented by the CSEA at the 
BOCES' Bath office. 
O^i ;' I 
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2. Negotiate in good faith with CSEA regarding 
imposition of smoking restrictions upon unit 
employees. 
3. Post notices in the form attached in its 
Bath office in locations ordinarily used to 
"' communicate information to tire unit em-
ployees. 
Dated: New York, New York 
December 2, 1980 
Ida Klaus, Member 
/(y^u^i^-
David C . R a n d i e s , ligfhber 
/ T * •£"*•<! 
<jt _ i _ ?•<& 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees that: the Steuben-Allegany BOCES (BOCES): .' 
1. Will rescind and cease enforcement of the June 1979 
directive regarding smoking restrictions insofar as 
that directive and enforcement practice apply to 
employees in the unit represented by the Steuben-, 
Allegany BOCES Unit, Steuben County Chapter,of the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) 
at the BOCES'' Bath office; 
2. Will negotiate in good faith with CSEA regarding 






This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTH ORANGETOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTB.ICT, 
Respondent, 
- and -
SOUTH ORMG^TOW^KlfCHEF WORKERS 
Charging Party. 
ARTHUR PRINDLE, ESQ., for Respondent 
GERARD E. MOLONY, ESQ., for 
Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the South 
Orangetown Kitchen Workers Association (Association) to a hearing 
officer's decision dismissing its charge that the South Orange-
town Central School District (District) had refused to negotiate 
with it in good faith. 
FACTS 
The District has employed cafeteria workers since 1971. On 
February 15, 1977, the District entered into an agreement with 
the Association in which it recognized the Association as the 
exclusive bargaining agent of the cafeteria workers. The agree-
ment, which covered the period September 1, 1977 through August 31, 
1979, specified that commencing September 1977, there would be 
sixteen cafeteria workers and that the number would be increased 
or decreased thereafter pursuant to a mutually acceptable pro-




/-CASE -NO-.- 4J-4315 
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Notwithstanding this agreement, the District abolished the 
unit positions on August 23, 1978, and it subcontracted its food 
service program.. The Association did not file an improper 
practice charge with respect to this conduct of the District but 
it did file a contract grievance. An arbitration award was issued 
on July 12, 1979, in which the arbitrator determined that the 
-District had -vio.lat.ed. ..._the contract. by._ Laying _p^ f ft he _ employ e_es. 
He awarded the sixteen employees, who were laid off, back pay in 
the aggregate amount of $64,351.06. 
On July 31, 1979, the Association sought to commence 
negotiations for an agreement to succeed the one that would 
expire on August 31, 1979, and the District met with the Asso-
ciation on August 16, 1979. At that negotiation session, it 
offered to re-hire the cafeteria workers and to pay them the same 
wages it paid to educational aides. The Association counter-
proposed a considerably higher salary schedule and the District 
responded that its ability to pay the wages sought by the 
Association was adversely affected by the arbitration award. It, 
therefore, proposed that the cafeteria workers waive their rights 
1 
under the arbitration award or some part of it. 
1 It is not clear from the record, but the District's proposal 
may have been that the cafeteria workers should yield some 
of the benefits won in the arbitration award even if they were 
to receive the same wages as the educational aides. The 
District's Labor Relations Consultant testifed (at Page 51) 
"Q. If they had accepted that offer that you made 
at that time, would they have had a contract 
without giving back the Arbitrator's Award." 
"A. It is very difficult for me to answer that 
because if the kitchen workers moved off their 
position on $7. down to the wage package that 
was already answered by other units , it was a 
good likelihood that we could have worked some-
thing out, yes. I don't know. It depends on 
what happens at the table." 
6615 
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The Association rejected the District's proposal and nego-
tiations were broken off. Two days later, the District declared 
an impasse and it sought the assistance of the conciliation sec-
tion of the Board for the resolution of that impasse. A fact-
finder was appointed and the District participated in the fact-
finding process. It, nevertheless, rejected the recommendation 
of the factfinder. 
The District's response to the charge was that it had been 
under no obligation to negotiate with the Association because the 
Association no longer represented any employees of the District. 
2 The hearing officer did not rule on the merits of this response.— 
Instead, she dismissed the charge on the ground that the evidence 
did not establish that the District refused to negotiate in good 
faith. 
DECISION 
In support of its exceptions, the Association argues that 
the conduct of the District in August 1979, and thereafter, did 
not constitute good faith negotiations. It contends that the 
District conditioned negotiations upon a waiver by the Associa-
tion of rights of unit employees that had accrued in the past. 
Thus, according to the Association, the District was not willing 
to-negotiate future terms and conditions of employment but was 
2 The arbitration award would appear to constitute a finding that 
the Association was assured that the District would continue to 
employ sixteen cafeteria workers for the contract period. At 
least until August 31, 1979, the cafeteria workers would appear 
to have continued to have had the status of employees of the 
District, even though they were not performing work at that 
time. 
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trying to force the union "to return money that was paid under a 
past contract." 
We do not read the record as supporting the Association's 
argument. The District entered into negotiations with the Associ-
ation and made a wage offer. During these negotiations, it indi-
catedthat its ability- to- pay was -affected- by -the liability that 
was occasioned by the arbitration award. It never indicated that 
it would not enter into an agreement with the Association unless 
the cafeteria workers waived the benefits won under the arbitra-
tion award; it merely indicated that the cost of those benefits 
was a factor that would affect the level of wages it would be 
willing to provide. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing 
officer and we order that the charge herein 
be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated, New York, New York 
December 2, 1980 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent, 
-and-
NASSAU CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
EDWARD G. McCABE, ESQ., (JACK OLCHIN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
RICHARD M. GABA, ESQ., (BARRY J. PEEK, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
The charge herein was filed by the Nass au Chapter of the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA). It alleges 
that the County of Nassau (County) violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Taylor Law in that it discontinued a past practice of assigning 
County-owned vehicles to employees of its Department of Public 
1 
Works on a 24-hour basis. The County acknowledged the conduct 
complained about, but it asserted that it was not violative of 
the Taylor Law. 
The hearing officer found merit in both specifications of 
the charge. He found that County employees in the Department of 
Public Works had enjoyed the benefit of County-owned vehicles, 
which were available on a 24-hour basis for use in connection with 
1 The charge also alleges that the County refused to negotiate 
the "impact" of the discontinuance of the use of County-owned 
vehicles, but it does not indicate the nature of the "impact" 
proposals. In view of our decision that the discontinuance of 
the use of vehicles is improper, we do not reach the impact 
issue. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3933 
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their employment as well as for driving to and from work, and that 
this benefit was eliminated by the County unilaterally. He also 
found that the county rejected a demand by CSEA that it negotiate 
the impact of the elimination of the benefit. On these facts, 
the hearing officer recommended that 
"the County be ordered forthwith to reinstate that 
practice and compensate the affected employees for 
reasonable expenses incurred for transporatation to 
-and - from- work-aince—January-!, -1979 ,-plus- interest - -
at 37c per annum, and to negotiate with CSEA, at its 
request, as to the use of County vehicles by employees 
in its Department of Public Works." 
The County has filed exceptions to the decision of the 
hearing officer. In support of those exceptions, it argues that 
the use of County-owned vehicles by employees in the Department 
of Public Works is not a mandatory subject of negotiation because 
that use was for the convenience of the County, rather than for 
the benefit of the employees. In connection with this argument, 
it complains that it was not given an adequate opportunity to 
establish relevant facts. A second argument made by the County 
is that the agreement between the County and CSEA contained a 
"zipper clause" which permitted the County to eliminate the use 
of County-owned vehicles. Third, the County argues that the- con-
tract between the parties did not require it to maintain past 
practices and, absent such a requirement, it was free to alter 
past practices. 
The record indicates that the County was not deprived of 
2 
any opportunity to establish relevant facts. The County's argu-
2 The basic facts are presented by stipulation. The County was 
also given an opportunity to submit additional allegations of 
fact in the form of an affidavit. Such affidavit would either 
have been the basis for an expansion of the stipulations or of 
a hearing. The County did not avail itself of the opportunity 
to submit the affidavit. 
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ment that employee use of its vehicles was not a mandatory subject 
of negotiation was considered by the hearing officer. So was.its 
argument that CSEA waived any right it may have had to negotiate 
as to the discontinuance of that use. For the reasons stated in 
his decision, we affirm the action of the hearing officer reject-
ing these arguments. The proposition that an employer may change 
a past practice as to working conditions unless there is a con-
tractual duty to maintain past practices was not considered by 
the hearing officer. We reject this proposition. The duty to 
negotiate in good faith includes an obligation to continue past 
practices that involve mandatory subjects of negotiation, even in 
the absence of a provision to that effect in the contract. Queens 
Borough Public Library, 8 PERB 13085-. (1975). We find that there 
was a duty to negotiate the subject matter of the past practice. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the County of Nassau to: 
1. Reinstate the practice of assigning County-
owned vehicles to certain employees of its 
Department of Public Works on a 24-hour 
basis; 
2. Compensate the affected employees for rea-
sonable expenses incurred for transportation 
to and from work since January 1, 1979, plus 
interest at 3% per annum; and 
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3. Negotiate with CSEA, at its request, as 
to the use of County-owned vehicles by 
employees in its Department of Public 
Works. 
Dated, New York, New York 
December 2, 1980 
K.. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
CM 
avid C . Randies ,/Memb.er 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OP CHILI, 
Y Employer, 
-and-
CHILI UNIT, MONROE COUNTY LOCAL, CSEA, 
INC . , LOCAL TO00, "AFSCME,"~ 
Petitioner. 
On June 23, 198 0, the Chili Unit, Monroe County Local, CSEA, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME (petitioner) filed, in accordance with 
the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, 
a timely petition for certification as the exclusive negotiating 
representative of certain employees employed by the Town of 
Chili (employer). The parties executed a consent agreement which 
was approved by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation on October 1, 198 0. The negotiating unit 
stipulated to therein was as follows: 
Included: The following positions in the Town 
Highway Department: Laborer, Motor 
Equipment Operator, General Mechanic, 
Mechanic, Working Foreman, Road Foreman 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Pursuant to the consent agreement, an election was held on 
November 5, 198 0. The results of the election indicate that the 
majority of eligible voters in the stipulated unit who cast 
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valid ballots do not desire to be represented for purposes of 
1 
collective negotiations by the petitioner. 
Therefore, it is ordered that the petition be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated: New York, New York 
-December 1, 19-8-0 
-sfc^e^ /vL 
Harold R, Newman, Chairman 
<^ *W / d & ^ _ ^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
1_ There were 8 ballots cast in favor of and 13 ballots against 
representation by the petitioner. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF.SENECA and LOCAL 850, CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondents, 
-and-
WILLIAM L. JONES, 
Charging Party, 
JOHN M. SIPOS, ESQ., for County of Seneca, 
Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH (MICHAEL J. SMITH, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Local 850, CSEA, 
Respondent 
WILLIAM L. JONES, pro se 
The charge herein was filed by William L. Jones, the 
Welfare Management System Coordinator of the County of Seneca 
(County), on February 14, 1980. He alleges that the County vio-
lated §209-a,l(a) and (c) of the Taylor Law in that it interfered 
with his rights and discriminated against him because he filed a 
contract grievance. He further alleges that Local 850 of the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) violated 
§209~a.2(a) in that it supported the improper conduct of the 
County. 
The alleged impropriety involves a grievance filed by Jones 
on October 30, 1979, pursuant to Article 15 of the agreement be-
tween the County and CSEA. The County rejected the grievance on 
the ground', that Jones was not covered by the agreement; it did 
not consider the position of Welfare Management System Coordinato:: 
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to be in the negotiating unit. Jones deemed the rejection of his 
grievance to have been occasioned by a conspiracy between the 
County and CSEA to deny him his contract rights and he filed the 
charge herein. 
The evidence presented at the hearing is that, prior to 
June 5-, 1978, Jones was emp loyed :by the County as an accountant, 
a position within the negotiating unit. The position of Welfare 
Management System Coordinator was created on May 23, 1978,;by a 
resolution of the County Board of Supervisors and Jones was ap-
pointed to that position in June 1978. The newly created position 
was not considered to be a unit position either when it was created 
or when Jones was promoted to it. Nevertheless, when the January 
1, 1979 agreement between the County and CSEA was distributed, it 
specified a salary for the position of Welfare Management System 
Coordinator., The salary contained in the schedule was not the 
actual salary received by Jones and, according to the testimony 
of the present and prior personnel directors of the County, the 
listing of the position in the salary schedule was a mistake. In 
support of this testimony, there is a letter from the current 
personnel officer of the County to the president of CSEA, dated 
October 17, 1979, indicating that "The title of Welfare Management 
System Coordinator is a typographical error on the 1979 schedule. 
This title should never have appeared on the, schedule." 
During the hearing, Jones sought to introduce evidence to 
establish that he was not a department head and could not be ex-
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eluded from the unit on that ground. The hearing officer rejected 
the testimony for the reason that even if Jones established that 
he is not a department head, it would not follow that he is in the 
negotiating unit. The hearing officer credited the testimony of the 
prior and present personnel officers of the County that the posi-
tion of Welfare Management System Coordinator was not in the nego-
tiating unit and she determined that proof that Jones was not a 
department head would therefore be irrelevant. In the absence of 
evidence that either the County or CSEA discriminated against 
Jones or interfered with his rights, the hearing officer dismissed 
the charge. 
Jones has filed exceptions to the hearing officer's decision 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law of the hearing officer. 
NOW, THEREFOR, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated, New York, New York 
December 2, 1980 
-^^^^^^S^^^g^, 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
S*^ /ri^u^^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
}U&. 
a v i d C, Rand i e s , Me/fiber 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF THE 
NEW PALTZ POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Upon the Application for Designation 
of Persons as Managerial or Confidential 
#21-12/2/80 
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ORDER 
CASE NO. E-0666 
J. PHILIP ZAND, ESQ., Attorney for Applicant 
The Board.of Police Commissioners of the New Paltz Police 
Department (Employer) filed an application on July 17, 1980, for 
the designation of its Chief of Police and Police Lieutenant as 
managerial or confidential employees in accordance with the 
criteria set forth in §201.7 of the Taylor Law. Rule 201.10(b) 
of this Board specifies that such an application "may be filed 
from the first day of the fourth month through the last day of 
the fifth month of the fiscal year of the public employer...." 
The fiscal year of the Employer is coterminous with the calendar 
year. Accordingly, an application would be- timely only if filed 
during the months of April and May. 
As the application herein was not timely filed, it was 
dismissed by the Acting Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Acting Director). The Employer has filed 
exceptions to the decision of the Acting Director. Its excep-
tions indicate no basis for a reversal of his decision. Rather, 
they refer to a related representation case (C-2079) brought by 
a petition of the New Paltz Police Association to represent all 
police officers who work for the Employer, including the Chief 
of Police and the Police Lieutenant. The Employer is opposing 
t.W 
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the petition because it objects to the inclusion of the Chief of 
Police and the Police Lieutenant in the negotiating unit. That 
case is presently before the Director of Public Employment Prac-
tices and Representation. It is independent of the instant case 
because the Chief of Police and the Police Lieutenant may be 
excluded from the negotiating unit on grounds specified in §201.7 
of .the—Taylor Law- even- if -they are not -designated as managerial 
or confidential employees. 
WE AFFIRM the findings of fact and conclusions of law of 
the Acting Director in the case before us, and 
WE ORDER that the application herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
December 2, 1980 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
3**u /dJU^c^-
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD' 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
-and-
CLARE J . ROSE, 
R e s p o n d e n t , 
#2J-12/2/80 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4276 
Charging Party 
JACK OLCHIN, ESQ., for Respondent 
WILLIAM D. FRIEDMAN, ESQ., for Charging 
Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Clare J. Rose, 
charging party herein, to a hearing officer's decision... dismissing:,-
her charge for failure to prosecute. 
The record shows that the attorneys for Rose and for the 
County of Nassau, respondent herein, both agreed that a. hear in?, 
was unnecessary because all relevant facts could be stipulated. 
The hearing officer gave the parties a series of extensions of 
time during which to prepare and file their stipulation, but they 
did not do so. He scheduled a hearing, but it was cancelled at 
the joint request of the parties' attorneys. It was originally 
agreed that the stipulation would be submitted on January 19, 
1980. After considerable correspondence, a final deadline was 
set for July 16, 1980. When that deadline was not met and no 
explanation of the delay was given the hearing officer dismissed 
the charge. 
In support of her exceptions, charging party states that, 
as a remedy for the dela3/, the hearing officer should have held 
a hearing and not dismissed the charge. The record indicates that 
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the hearing officer had scheduled hearings for November 14, 1979 
and May 21, 1980. Both were adjourned at the request of the 
charging party as well as of the respondent, and not on the hear-
ing officer's own motion. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing offi-
cer, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed. 
Dated, New York, New York 
December 2, 1980 
'Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
c&4i /d^uu^— 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATION EOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and -




Case No. C-2035 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
_.___i..- _^A representation proceeding having been conducted in the __ 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board, .in accordance 
with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating repre-
sentative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees'. Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Rochester Teachers Association, 
NYSUT, AFT 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. " 
Unit: Included: All Education Associates. 
Excluded.: All others. 
Further,'IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Rochester Teachers Association, 
NYSUT, AFT 
arid enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall-
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 1st day of December, 19 8 0 
New. York, New York 
Harold, li. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
6631 D.wid C. R a n d i e s , MeioBei 
'" STATE OF NEW YORK-
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT l<Ehl\r7.n'M BOARD 
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In the Matter of 




CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
Petitioner., 
- and -
ORLEANS-NIAGARA- BOCES ASSOCIATION OF 
EDUCATIONAL SECRETARIES, . • 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER. TO NEGOTIATE _ _ _ 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord^ 
il ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
! I Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
j| negotiating representative has been selected, 
ii ' -
P u r s u a n t t o t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n t h e Bor r d by t h e 
P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r Employment A c t , 
I T IS HERE3Y CERTIFIED t h a t t h e O r l e a n s - N i a g a r a BOCES 
• A s s o c i a t i o n of E d u c a t i o n a l S e c r e t a r i e s 
h a s b e e n d e s i g n a t e d . a n d s e l e c t e d by a m a j o r i t y o f t h e employees 
j of t h e a b o v e named p u b l i c e m p l o y e r , i n t h e u n i t d e s c r i b e d b e l o w , 
'; a s t h e i r e x c l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f c o l l e c t i v e 
j n e g o t i a t i o n s and t h e s e t t l e m e n t of g r i e v a n c e s . . .. 
j U n i t : I n c l u d e d : U n i t 1 - C l e r i c a l S t a f f - A c c o u n t C l e r k / T y p i s t , 
! S e n i o r C l e r k , A u d i o - V i s u a l A i d e , T y p i s t , 
| S t e n o g r a p h e r , P a y r o l l C l e r k , N u r s e . 
E x c l u d e d : Secretary t o D i s t r i c t Super intendent / Internal Auditor, 
Secretary t o Ass i s t an t Superintendent for Administrat ion/ 
Board Clerk, Secretary t o Ass i s t an t Superintendent for 
Ins t ruc t ion , Senior Account C l e r k / D i s t r i c t Treasurer, 
• Resource Materials Manager, Superintendent of Buildings 
and Grounds, and a l l o ther employees.-
j F u r t h e r , I T I S ORDERED t h a t t h e above named p u b l i c e m p l o y t ^ 
| s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h t h e O r l e a n s - N i a g a r a BOCES 
i A s s o c i a t i o n of E d u c a t i o n a l S e c r e t a r i e s 
f 
i and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
I with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
; negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
| determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
1
 Signed on the 1st day of December \ 198O 
j New.York, New York 
^£X^/f/^ ^M/-^*ii 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Cha i rman 
I d a ICliius, Member 
PJ2RB 38 .4 Cranio. 
